|
Lawfare analysis in Defense Department Report on China
Written by Aaron Eitan Meyer
Wednesday, 31 August 2011 18:33
|
|
|
Last week, the U.S. Department of Defense released its 2011 Annual Report to Congress on the Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China. The Report includes a brief notice of lawfare, referred to as "legal warfare," that builds somewhat from the description contained in the 2010 Annual Report. Both Reports note that "legal warfare" is a component of the “three warfares” concept of modern asymmetric warfare but, unlike the 2010 Report (which considered all three warfares to be subcategories of “information warfare”), the 2011 Report explains that the concept "reflects China’s desire to effectively exploit these force enablers in the run up to and during hostilities. During military training and exercises, PLA troops employ the three warfares to undermine the spirit and ideological commitment of the adversary. In essence, it is a non-military tool used to advance or catalyze a military objective." The 2011 Report briefly describes the term as follows: "Legal Warfare uses international and domestic law to claim the legal high ground or assert Chinese interests. It can be employed to hamstring an adversary’s operational freedom and shape the operational space. Legal warfare is also intended to build international support and manage possible political repercussions of China’s military actions. China has attempted to employ legal warfare in the maritime domain and in international airspace in pursuit of a security buffer zone." Unfortunately, the 2011 Report fails to further consider lawfare, and does not acknowledge that lawfare – or "legal warfare," to use the Report’s terminology – is a theory of warfare with considerably broader application than the above examples indicate. This omission is particularly glaring in regard to strategic interests served by lawfare; "claim[ing] the legal high ground" and "assert[ing] Chinese interests" are by no means the only strategic values lawfare holds, for China or any other nation. Perhaps the 2012 Report will develop these issues more thoroughly. |